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PreviewsTo conclude, Zandvakili and Kohn
(2015) present the first definitive evidence
that spiking coordination does indeed
have a modest impact on the efficacy of
transmission in the neocortex. They also
show that the effects of spiking coordina-
tion in a source population do not propa-
gate past the input layers of the target
population, at least in the early visual cor-
tex. However, it remains possible that
more subtle aspects of coding beyond
the input layers are affected. Importantly,
they have established an empirical frame-
work in which such hypotheses can be
directly tested at the level where cortical
computations are performed: spiking ac-
tivity in neuronal populations.678 Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 ElsevREFERENCES
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Behavioral flexibility requires the brain to maintain and rely on cognitive contexts for dictating appropriate
responses. Saez et al. (2015) demonstrate that such abstract rule-based representations co-exist in prefron-
tal cortices and in the amygdala, with the latter being surprisingly crucial for correct performance.The hallmark of successful learning is the
ability to produce appropriate behavioral
action in response to a specific external
stimulus that has an emotional value.
However, the same stimulus can produce
different, and in times even opposite, ac-
tions and emotional responses—depend-
ing on the exact context in which it is
encountered. For example, an approach-
ing lion induces an approach response
accompanied by excitement and elevated
mood when encountered in the zoo. If
encountered in the wild, however, the
exact same lion stimulus would induce
fear and pose an immediate threat that
calls for a dramatically different action—
a flight response. Sometimes contexts
can even be un-cued and instead simply
be defined by a cognitive process. For
example, the same hand of cards canhave a different meaning depending
upon one’s understanding of the rules of
the game being played.
This ability to react in accordance with
multiple particular contexts requires the
adoption of a complete, context-specific
behavioral set. Such behavioral sets allow
rapid switching between different behav-
iors and actions, depending on the
context in which the stimulus is experi-
enced. Interestingly, these commonly
used adaptive behavioral sets are an an-
tipode of classical conditioning theories.
In these learning schemes, the internal
value assigned to a conditioned stimulus
(CS) is altered when the stimulus is
coupled to a meaningful (appetitive or
aversive) unconditioned outcome (US).
The conditioned response (CR) is the
external manifestation of the internalvalue reflecting the learned association,
and it is limited to the specific stimulus.
Classical theoretical models of condition-
ing (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; Sutton
and Barto, 1998) predict that a change in
the reinforcement value would necessi-
tate re-learning of the new association.
Conversely, context-based adaptation
means that not only the response to a sin-
gle stimulus is changed without having to
re-learn the CS-US pairing again and
again, but that responses to other stimuli
also change simultaneously—reflecting
the switch to a wholly different behavioral
set. Acquisition and maintenance of such
complete behavioral sets offer a clear
evolutionary advantage. Without a repre-
sentation of behavioral sets, an organism
would have to re-learn all CS-US associa-
tions in every context again and again,
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effort, posing a serious survival threat.
Context-based switches can also
greatly assist in regulation of emotion.
We need not gradually learn to feel
safe next to each type of, otherwise
dangerous, animal in the zoo. Rather,
switching to the safe context provides a
regulatory mechanism of emotional con-
trol. Clinical implications of dysfunction
in such a mechanism may include un-
controlled emotional swings due to the
need to re-learn associations repeatedly
in the absence of appropriate behavioral
sets to switch to. Conversely, ossified
clinging to one irrelevant context can
result in a host of maladaptive behaviors
and emotional inappropriate responses.
Such can be the case, for example, in
mood disorders like depression and
post-traumatic stress.
Traditionally, prefrontal cortices (PFCs)
were considered to acquire and hold
information about rules (Buckley et al.,
2009; Wallis et al., 2001; Wilson et al.,
2014). These textbook findingsmake intu-
itive sense when considering the develop-
ment and expansion of prefrontal regions
in primates and their advanced ability to
use abstract rules and smartly switch be-
tween behavioral sets according to the
situation. The amygdala, on the other
hand, is traditionally associated with facil-
itating and encoding the associations
between a stimulus and its outcome; in
particular, when this outcome has an
emotional value, and even more specif-
ically when the value is a negative one.
This ‘‘fear-centered’’ view of the amyg-
dala has dominated the field and oriented
amygdala research, even if not explicitly.
Yet a recent surge of electrophysiological
studies in primates has revealed a much
more complex picture, showing, for
example, that primate amygdala neurons
hold information about both positive and
negative values (Paton et al., 2006), signal
safety (Genud-Gabai et al., 2013), and
expectation (Belova et al., 2007); process
spatial cues to orient attention (Peck et al.,
2013); compute prediction errors (Klavir
et al., 2013); and signal internally gener-
ated reward-based choices (Herna´di
et al., 2015), as well as mediate general-
ization of learning (Resnik and Paz,
2015) and interact closely with the pre-
frontal cortex to guide statistical learning
(Livneh and Paz, 2012).Nevertheless, taking active part in
maintaining abstract information about
context and rules, and hence allowing
the use of behavioral sets to guide action,
remained the domain of PFCs alone.
Considering the evolutionary expansion
and extensive bidirectional connectivity
between the amygdala and PFCs in pri-
mates, Saez et al. (2015) provide data
that challenge this view. To do so, they
taught monkeys to collect fluid reward in
two CS-US pairing sets, or contexts. In
each context, the reward was adminis-
tered exclusively after one of the two
stimuli. The reinforcement contingencies
of the two CSs reversed back and
forth many times in experiments to create
the two contexts. Sometimes, a clear
additional visual cue marked the con-
text within a trial, but on the majority of tri-
als, context was un-cued, so monkeys
had to represent the context as an in-
ternal cognitive variable. Monkeys indeed
switched their behavior reflecting reward
expectancy for the two CSs after every
block switch. Remarkably, once the mon-
keys had experienced that one CS had
switched its reinforcement contingency,
they inferred correctly that the other CS
had switched its contingency after the
block switch, even though they had not
yet experienced that CS as having
switched. Indeed, monkeys’ reward ex-
pectancy behavior reflected an abrupt
and persistent transition between con-
texts. This was the case even for the first
CS-US reversal experienced in an experi-
ment. Monkeys thereby exhibited clear
cognitive, internally represented, context
usage. In simple terms, they understood
the abstract rule and task structure and
did not need to learn de novo the associ-
ations per each new stimulus (as ex-
pected from classical learning theories).
To probe the differential representa-
tions of abstract context, stimulus iden-
tity, and reward expectancy, Saez et al.
(2015) recorded single units from the
amygdala and two PFC regions: the ante-
rior cingulate (ACC) and the orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC), both densely intercon-
nected with the amygdala (Ghashghaei
et al., 2007). They found that stimulus
identity and reward expectancy were rep-
resented extensively in all three regions,
and they identified for the first time that in-
formation about context is represented in
ACC and OFC.Neuron 87Yet to their (and our) surprise, informa-
tion about context was encoded by
amygdala neurons as well and, moreover,
to a similar extent as in the PFC. Impor-
tantly, this information was available
even before stimulus onset, as can be ex-
pected from knowledge about abstract
context. To reach these conclusions,
Saez et al. (2015) used both the standard
approach of quantifying unit responses in
relation to task parameters, but they also
exploited the use of linear decoders.
This approach has several benefits: first,
it allows aggregating information from all
recorded neurons and hence probing
population coding within a region; sec-
ond, even if we do not know how the neu-
rons precisely code information (a funda-
mental problem in all of neuroscience),
the decoder approach circumvents this
elegantly and probes the available infor-
mation; third, and importantly, it allows
training the decoder on a set of the trials
to distinguish between two conditions
and then testing whether this trained
decoder can distinguish between two
conditions on held-out trials. One can
then draw conclusions about similarities
and discrepancies in the amount of infor-
mation across conditions, and thus reach
further insights into what the neurons
actually code for.
For example, if the decoder was trained
on trials without an explicit contextual cue
but was tested on trials with it, the decod-
ing performance for context was just as
good. This is strong evidence that the in-
formation held is indeed about abstract
context. In a similar way, it was shown
that decoding context does not rely on
recent memory trace of specific stimuli.
Instead, and importantly, the context
representation reflects the linked sets of
CS-US associations that defined each
context—the relevant ‘‘behavioral set’’ for
this task. This is a powerful demonstration
for coding of abstract rules rather than
traditional reinforcement-driven computa-
tions only, which is especially surprising
to observe in the amygdala.
Luckily and naturally, monkeys also
performed errors. An intelligent observa-
tion of how decoding properties signal in-
formation during such trials allowed the
authors to determine that errors could
not be accounted for by failures in
stimulus identification encoding. Rather,
errors were correlated with a decrease, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 679
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seen most prominently in the amygdala.
Hence, not only is context represented
in the amygdala, but failure to maintain
this information might contribute to
behavioral failures. It reinforces the inter-
pretation that the abstract context signals
observed in the amygdala are more than
mere correlates projected from previously
identified cortices, but that the amygdala
takes active part (causal?) in contributing
to make the final decision and computing
action and outcome expectancies.
Such findings might have important
clinical implications. If the amygdala holds
abstract context and behavioral sets that
are responsible for appropriate action
(yet at the same time is highly modulated
by emotional reinforcement, as we know
from many studies), then minor failures
in the coding process can result in
psychopathological conditions. From a
computational perspective, it requires
careful separation of transient reinforce-
ment-driven computations from abstract
rule-based representations and their cor-
rect integration when required—all within
the same network.
These findings strongly suggest, for the
first time, that the amygdala actively
participates in maintenance of abstract
cognitively relevant information. The next
steps therefore should be to identify the
mechanisms and brain regions by which
learning of the context, or rule abstrac-
tion, is mediated. For example, does the
amygdala participate in learning the
context abstraction as well? Alternatively,
behavioral sets can be learned via pre-
frontal circuits as commonly hypothe-
sized and only later projected into the
amygdala, allowing this information to
interact with transient reinforcement680 Neuron 87, August 19, 2015 ª2015 Elsevproperties and stimulus-outcome associ-
ations to reach the correct action in each
specific real-world experience.
These challenges require three major
steps in our view. The first is the simulta-
neous recordings and analyses of activity
in multiple brain regions (and multiple
neurons within them). This would allow
identifying the information not only within
a region, but also the information trans-
ferred across regions and potentially
evenmaintained across regions. It is tech-
nologically plausible, but the application
and development of analyses and analyt-
ical methods is still ongoing.
The second is the use of direct analyses
approaches that go beyond decoding
and/or the use and interpretation of
several decoder options. The elegant
use of decoding in this study allowed
Saez et al. (2015) to ask and answer
several important aspects about the in-
formation maintained, but decoders do
not directly address the question of how
exactly information is coded, and how
exactly downstream networks read it. Ex-
tending to different types of decoders and
directly observing information in precise
spiking properties might offer more in-
sights. We note that this is a general major
challenge in the field.
Finally, electrophysiological studies of
complex rule switching, especially during
learning of new rules and contexts, pose
a major challenge for neuroscientists,
mainly due to variability and erratic
behavior that imposes major confounds
on interpretations of neural findings.
Moreover, realistic rule-based scenarios
can entail much larger stimulus-outcome
sets, leading to more complex and
harder-to-control experimental conditions.
Following this important study by Saezier Inc.et al. (2015), the next big challenge would
be to attempt to study and track the brain
substrates of learning, executing and
switching between complex rules, and
identifying large circuit-based interactions.
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